Paulson is outsourcing the bailout

This is breathtakingly major bad news. From WaPo:

The Treasury Department this week plans to start outsourcing the management of up to $700 billion in troubled securities, using special contracting authorities that enable it to retain private portfolio managers, custodians and other financial services consultants without following standard acquisition procedures.

The department’s quick turn to the private sector will help it prepare for the massive task of overseeing mortgages and other financial assets to be acquired by the government as part of the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act that was approved by Congress and signed by President Bush last Friday.

But it means that the government has little time to assess the companies that will be partners in what could become one of the largest public sector funds in American history. Some of the same firms that have played roles in the rise and collapse of the mortgage-backed securities market may end up guiding the government as the bailout unfolds, department officials said.

The job of repairing the financial system is being outsourced (think "fees and commissions") to the very numbskulls who caused this mess in the first place.

Perfect.


current-events

Economics is Politics

The Political Nature of the Economic Crisis
By George Friedman

Are the resources of the United States sufficient to redefine financial markets in such a way as to manage the outcome of this crisis, or has the crisis become so large that even the resources of a $14 trillion economy mobilized by the state can’t do the job?

Classical economists like Adam Smith and David Ricardo referred to their discipline as “political economy.” Smith’s great work, “The Wealth of Nations,” was written by the man who held the chair in moral philosophy at the University of Glasgow. This did not seem odd at the time and is not odd now. Economics is not a freestanding discipline, regardless of how it is regarded today. It is a discipline that can only be understood when linked to politics, since the wealth of a nation rests on both these foundations, and it can best be understood by someone who approaches it from a moral standpoint, since economics makes significant assumptions about both human nature and proper behavior.

The modern penchant to regard economics as a discrete science parallels the belief that economics is a distinct sphere of existence — at its best when it is divorced from political and even moral considerations. Our view has always been that the economy can only be understood and forecast in the context of politics, and that the desire to separate the two derives from a moral teaching that Smith would not embrace. Smith understood that the word “economy” without the adjective “political” did not describe reality. We need to bear Smith in mind when we try to understand the current crisis.

Societies have two sorts of financial crises. The first sort is so large it overwhelms a society’s ability to overcome it, and the society sinks deeper into dysfunction and poverty. In the second sort, the society has the resources to manage the situation — albeit at a collective price. Societies that can manage the crisis have two broad strategies. The first strategy is to allow the market to solve the problem over time. The second strategy is to have the state organize the resources of society to speed up the resolution. The market solution is more efficient over time, producing better outcomes and disciplining financial decision-making in the long run. But the market solution can create massive collateral damage, such as high unemployment, on the way to the superior resolution. The state-organized resolution creates inequities by not sufficiently punishing poor economic decisions, and creates long-term inefficiencies that are costly. But it has the virtue of being quicker and mitigating collateral damage.

Three Views of the Financial Crisis

There is a first group that argues the current financial crisis already has outstripped available social resources, so that there is no market or state solution. This group asserts that the imbalances created in the financial markets are so vast that the market solution must consist of an extended period of depression. Any attempt by the state to appropriate social resources to solve the financial imbalance not only will be ineffective, it will prolong the crisis even further, although perhaps buying some minor alleviation up front. The thinking goes that the financial crisis has been building for years and the economy can no longer be protected from it, and that therefore an extended period of discipline and austerity — beginning with severe economic dislocations — is inevitable. This is not a majority view, but it is widespread; it opposes government action on the grounds that the government will make a terrible situation worse.

A second group argues that the financial crisis has not outstripped the ability of society — organized by the state — to manage, but that it has outstripped the market’s ability to manage it. The financial markets have been the problem, according to this view, and have created a massive liquidity crisis. The economy — as distinct from the financial markets — is relatively sound, but if the liquidity crisis is left unsolved, it will begin to affect the economy as a whole. Since the financial markets are unable to solve the problem in a time frame that will not dramatically affect the economy, the state must mobilize resources to impose a solution on the financial markets, introducing liquidity as the preface to any further solutions. This group believes, like the first group, that the financial crisis could have profound economic ramifications. But the second group also believes it is possible to contain the consequences. This is the view of th e Bush administration, the congressional leadership, the Federal Reserve Board and most economic leaders.

There is a third group that argues that the state mobilization of resources to save the financial system is in fact an attempt to save financial institutions, including many of those whose imprudence and avarice caused the current crisis. This group divides in two. The first subgroup agrees the current financial crisis could have profound economic consequences, but believes a solution exists that would bring liquidity to the financial markets without rescuing the culpable. The second subgroup argues that the threat to the economic system is overblown, and that the financial crisis will correct itself without major state intervention but with some limited implementation of new regulations.

The first group thus views the situation as beyond salvation, and certainly rejects any political solution as incapable of addressing the issues from the standpoint of magnitude or competence. This group is out of the political game by its own rules, since for it the situation is beyond the ability of politics to make a difference — except perhaps to make the situation worse.

The second group represents the establishment consensus, which is that the markets cannot solve the problem but the federal government can — provided it acts quickly and decisively enough.

The third group spoke Sept. 29, when a coalition of Democrats and Republicans defeated the establishment proposal. For a myriad of reasons, some contradictory, this group opposed the bailout. The reasons ranged from moral outrage at protecting the interests of the perpetrators of this crisis to distrust of a plan implemented by this presidential administration, from distrust of the amount of power ceded the Treasury Department of any administration to a feeling the problem could be managed. It was a diverse group that focused on one premise — namely, that delay would not lead to economic catastrophe.

From Economic to Political Problem

The problem ceased to be an economic problem months ago. More precisely, the economic problem has transformed into a political problem. Ever since the collapse of Bear Stearns, the primary actor in the drama has been the federal government and the Federal Reserve, with its powers increasing as the nature of potential market outcomes became more and more unsettling. At a certain point, the size of the problem outstripped the legislated resources of the Treasury and the Fed, so they went to Congress for more power and money. This time, they were blocked.

It is useful to reflect on the nature of the crisis. It is a tale that can be as complicated as you wish to make it, but it is in essence simple and elegant. As interest rates declined in recent years, investors — particularly conservative ones — sought to increase their return without giving up safety and liquidity. They wanted something for nothing, and the market obliged. They were given instruments ultimately based on mortgages on private homes. They therefore had a very real asset base — a house — and therefore had collateral. The value of homes historically had risen, and therefore the value of the assets appeared secured. Financial instruments of increasing complexity eventually were devised, which were bought by conservative investors. In due course, these instruments were bought by less conservative investors, who used them as collateral for borrowing money. They used this money to buy other instruments in a pyramiding scheme that rested on one premise: the existence of houses whose value remained stable or grew.

Unfortunately, housing prices declined. A period of uncertainty about the value of the paper based on home mortgages followed. People claimed to be confused as to what the real value of the paper was. In fact, they were not so much confused as deceptive. They didn’t want to reveal that the value of the paper had declined dramatically. At a certain point, the facts could no longer be hidden, and vast amounts of value evaporated — taking with them not only the vast pyramids of those who first created the instruments and then borrowed heavily against them, but also the more conservative investors trying to put their money in a secure space while squeezing out a few extra points of interest. The decline in housing prices triggered massive losses of money in the financial markets, as well as reluctance to lend based on uncertainty of values. The result was a liquidity crisis, which simply meant that a lot of people had gone broke and that those who still had money weren’t lending it — certainly not to financial institutions.

The S&L Precedent

Such financial meltdowns based on shifts in real estate prices are not new. In the 1970s, regulations on savings and loans (S&Ls) had changed. Previously, S&Ls had been limited to lending in the consumer market, primarily in mortgages for homes. But the regulations shifted, and they became allowed to invest more broadly. The assets of these small banks, of which there were thousands, were attractive in that they were a pool of cash available for investment. The S&Ls subsequently went into commercial real estate, sometimes with their old management, sometimes with new management who had bought them, as their depositors no longer held them.

The infusion of money from the S&Ls drove up the price of commercial real estate, which the institutions regarded as stable and conservative investments, not unlike private homes. They did not take into account that their presence in the market was driving up the price of commercial real estate irrationally, however, or that commercial real estate prices fluctuate dramatically. As commercial real estate values started to fall, the assets of the S&Ls contracted until most failed. An entire sector of the financial system simply imploded, crushing shareholders and threatening a massive liquidity crisis. By the late 1980s, the entire sector had melted down, and in 1989 the federal government intervened.

The federal government intervened in that crisis as it had in several crises large and small since 1929. Using the resources at its disposal, the federal government took over failed S&Ls and their real estate investments, creating the Resolution Trust Corp. (RTC). The amount of assets acquired was about $394 billion dollars in 1989 — or 6.7 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) — making it larger than the $700 billion dollars — or 5 percent of GDP — being discussed now. Rather than flooding the markets with foreclosed commercial property, creating havoc in the market and further destroying assets, the RTC held the commercial properties off the market, maintaining their price artificially. They then sold off the foreclosed properties in a multiyear sequence that recovered much of what had been spent acquiring the properties. More important, it prevented the decline in commercial real estate from accelerating and creating liquidity crises throughout the entire economy.

Many of those involved in S&Ls were ruined. Others managed to use the RTC system to recover real estate and to profit. Still others came in from the outside and used the RTC system to build fortunes. The RTC is not something to use as moral lesson for your children. But the RTC managed to prevent the transformation of a financial crisis into an economic meltdown. It disrupted market operations by introducing large amounts of federal money to bring liquidity to the system, then used the ability of the federal government — not shared by individuals — to hold on to properties. The disruption of the market’s normal operations was designed to avoid a market outcome. By holding on to the assets, the federal government was able to create an artificial market in real estate, one in which supply was constrained by the government to manage the value of commercial real estate. It did not work perfectly — far from it. But it managed to avoid the most feared outcome, which was a depression.

There have been many other federal interventions in the markets, such as the bailout of Chrysler in the 1970s or the intervention into failed Third World bonds in the 1980s. Political interventions in the American (or global) marketplace are hardly novel. They are used to control the consequences of bad decisions in the marketplace. Though they introduce inefficiencies and frequently reward foolish decisions, they achieve a single end: limiting the economic consequences of these decisions on the economy as a whole. Good idea or not, these interventions are institutionalized in American economic life and culture. The ability of Americans to be shocked at the thought of bailouts is interesting, since they are not all that rare, as judged historically.

The RTC showed the ability of federal resources — using taxpayer dollars — to control financial processes. In the end, the S&L story was simply one of bad decisions resulting in a shortage of dollars. On top of a vast economy, the U.S. government can mobilize large amounts of dollars as needed. It therefore can redefine the market for money. It did so in 1989 during the S&L crisis, and there was a general acceptance it would do so again Sept. 29.

The RTC Model and the Road Ahead

As discussed above, the first group argues the current crisis is so large that it is beyond the federal government’s ability to redefine. More precisely, it would argue that the attempt at intervention would unleash other consequences — such as weakening dollars and inflation — meaning the cure would be worse than the disease. That may be the case this time, but it is difficult to see why the consequences of this bailout would be profoundly different from the RTC bailout — namely, a normal recession that would probably happen anyway.

The debate between the political leadership and those opposing its plan is more interesting. The fundamental difference between the RTC and the current bailout was institutional. Congress created a semi-independent agency operating under guidelines to administer the S&L bailout. The proposal that was defeated Sept. 29 would have given the secretary of the Treasury extraordinary personal powers to dispense the money. Some also argued that the return on the federal investment was unclear, whereas in the RTC case it was fairly clear. In the end, all of this turned on the question of urgency. The establishment group argued that time was running out and the financial crisis was about to morph into an economic crisis. Those voting against the proposal argued there was enough time to have a more defined solution.

There was obviously a more direct political dimension to all this. Elections are just more than a month a way, and the seat of every U.S. representative is in contest. The public is deeply distrustful of the establishment, and particularly of the idea that the people who caused the crisis might benefit from the bailout. The congressional opponents of the plan needed to demonstrate sensitivity to public opinion. Having done so, if they force a redefinition of the bailout plan, an additional 13 votes can likely be found to pass the measure.

But the key issue is this: Are the resources of the United States sufficient to redefine financial markets in such a way as to manage the outcome of this crisis, or has the crisis become so large that even the resources of a $14 trillion economy mobilized by the state can’t do the job? If the latter is true, then all other discussions are irrelevant. Events will take their course, and nothing can be done. But if that is not true, that means that politics defines the crisis, as it has other crisis. In that case, the federal government can marshal the resources needed to redefine the markets and the key decision-makers are not on Wall Street, but in Washington. Thus, when the chips are down, the state trumps the markets.

All of this may not be desirable, efficient or wise, but as an empirical fact, it is the way American society works and has worked for a long time. We are seeing a case study in it — including the possibility the state will refuse to act, creating an interesting and profound situation. This would allow the market alone to define the outcome of the crisis. This has not been allowed in extreme crises in 75 years, and we suspect this tradition of intervention will not be broken now. The federal government will act in due course, and an institutional resolution taking power from the Treasury and placing it in the equivalent of the RTC will emerge. The question is how much time remains before massive damage is done to the economy.

Reprinted by permission of Stratfor

current-events

Paulson wants your money

You! Fork it over!

Well, the vote on that bogus bailout plan certainly was a squeeker, but apparently the citizens knew which side was up, even if Congress didn't. Reports from representatives' offices say that the incoming emails, phone calls and passenger pigeons was roughly 100-1 against a bailout, and this was without any community organizers rousing the citizenry.

Of special note are the several hundred professional economists around the country who think the holdup bailout - or at least the scam plan as originally proposed by Treas Sec Hank Paulson - was naked theft, and signed a petition to that effect. See here.

But what to do, what to do? This really is a mess, with worldwide ramifications - the queen of England had her allowance frozen, Gadzooks! - and stock markets globally are falling over the proverbial cliff. McCain was clueless, but the godlike Obama actually came up with a plan, which has been endorsed by George Soros, no less, although I wouldn't be surprised to learn that Soros wrote the plan himself and slipped it to Barry in the dark of the night. Anyhoo, from the Economist, here's George:

Mr Paulson’s record does not inspire the confidence necessary to give him discretion over $700bn. [No shit] His actions last week brought on the crisis that makes rescue necessary. On Monday he allowed Lehman Brothers to fail and refused to make government funds available to save AIG. By Tuesday he had to reverse himself and provide an $85bn loan to AIG on punitive terms. The demise of Lehman disrupted the commercial paper market. A large money market fund “broke the buck” and investment banks that relied on the commercial paper market had difficulty financing their operations. By Thursday a run on money market funds was in full swing and we came as close to a meltdown as at any time since the 1930s. Mr Paulson reversed again and proposed a systemic rescue.[Hank's wife is on the board of AIG, BTW]

Mr Paulson had got a blank cheque from Congress once before. That was to deal with Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. His solution landed the housing market in the worst of all worlds: their managements knew that if the blank cheques were filled out they would lose their jobs, so they retrenched and made mortgages more expensive and less available. Within a few weeks the market forced Mr Paulson’s hand and he had to take them over.

Mr Paulson’s proposal to purchase distressed mortgage-related securities poses a classic problem of asymmetric information. The securities are hard to value but the sellers know more about them than the buyer: in any auction process the Treasury would end up with the dregs. The proposal is also rife with latent conflict of interest issues [You think?]. Unless the Treasury overpays for the securities, the scheme would not bring relief. But if the scheme is used to bail out insolvent banks, what will the taxpayers get in return? [Ooh, ooh - I know the answer to that one= zip, zero, and a lifetime of tax slavery!]

Barack Obama has outlined four conditions that ought to be imposed: an upside for the taxpayers as well as a downside; a bipartisan board to oversee the process; help for the homeowners as well as the holders of the mortgages; and some limits on the compensation of those who benefit from taxpayers’ money. These are the right principles. They could be applied more effectively by capitalising the institutions that are burdened by distressed securities directly rather than by relieving them of the distressed securities.

The injection of government funds would be much less problematic if it were applied to the equity rather than the balance sheet. $700bn in preferred stock with warrants may be sufficient to make up the hole created by the bursting of the housing bubble. By contrast, the addition of $700bn on the demand side of an $11,000bn market may not be sufficient to arrest the decline of housing prices.

Something also needs to be done on the supply side. To prevent housing prices from overshooting on the downside, the number of foreclosures has to be kept to a minimum. The terms of mortgages need to be adjusted to the homeowners’ ability to pay.

The rescue package leaves this task undone. Making the necessary modifications is a delicate task rendered more difficult by the fact that many mortgages have been sliced up and repackaged in the form of collateralised debt obligations. The holders of the various slices have conflicting interests. It would take too long to work out the conflicts to include a mortgage modification scheme in the rescue package. The package can, however, prepare the ground by modifying bankruptcy law as it relates to principal residences.

Bearing in mind that Joe Biden was a prime sponsor of the piece of shit Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 [sic, sic, sic & sic], that last bit is probably a non-starter, too.





current-events

Third Wave: The Coming Crash

Actual photo from the last Great Depression
Photo (c)1937 by Margaret Bourke-White

All signs are that the United States is headed straight into an economic meltdown and a second Great Depression, and inquiring minds everywhere are asking when this coming economic crash will hit and what it will be like.

As to the first question, the gold standard of economic gurus - Nouriel Roubini - has predicted the Third Wave (a surfer term meaning "the Big One") for August-September of this year (Source). As for the second question, we do in fact have a good model for the coming living conditions in the history of the last Great Depression, which lasted from 1929 until 1940, and were eleven years of pure hell. See the Great Depression timeline at: Timeline.

The average unemployment rate during the whole period of the Great Depression was roughly 17% nationally, rising to 30+% in selected areas - the South, Appalachia, and the Midwest. Depending on where one lived, that was one person in five to one-in-three unemployed and unemployable. At the beginning of WWII, the rate was still 17%. The Great Depression was a world-wide event; with the possible exception of sub-Saharan Africa, no nation on earth was exempt. During those years, some 80% of the population dropped off the tax rolls! (Ibid)

The naked numbers are misleading, though, because in America the Midwest was also in the midst of a 100-year drought which combined with high winds and poor cultivation techniques to desertify hundreds of thousands of acres of the Midwest (creating the "black blizzards" of the Dust Bowl) and drove millions of farmers off their land, resulting in the great Okie migration to California. 50% of family farms failed during this time.

California then became the breadbasket for America, but at near-starvation wages for the laborers. My father (then a teenager) made $5 a day picking potatoes and other crops, which is backbreaking labor, and not for the old or infirm. That source of labor income is mostly gone now because of highly mechanized harvesting techniques, although stoop labor is still required for vegetables such as lettuce, berries, potatoes, etc. (The West coast is the source of beets, potatoes, apples, berries, leaf vegetables, carrots, strawberries, oranges, peas, etc from the Imperial Valley in Southern California up to the apple trees in Washington State and the potato fields of Idaho). Wheat and corn are Midwestern crops and almost entirely mechanized, but heavily dependent on fuel prices, so expect shortages of bread and maybe ration cards. Danger point: about half of today's American shopping cart is filled with products from overseas. Source.

Presently, harvesting in the West is principally done by Mexican migrant labor, with a smattering of low-rent whites, so one of the effects of the depression will be the instant roundup, incarceration and/or deportation of the present immigrant population in California and the Southwest, expanding to a national effort (that's what the "concentration camps" were built for; the roundup plans are already on the books). This will be a massive undertaking, so look for job opportunities in "law enforcement." Anyone caught in public speaking Spanish will probably be shot, beaten or hung on the spot by vigilante groups.

The coming depression may not be quite as severe as the last one, but it will still be bad. Most Americans will still have a job, but at reduced wages and benefits; they will pay more (sometimes a lot more) for critical items like food and gas, including heating and cooking fuels. Electricity prices will fluctuate wildly depending on what is generating your electric (hydro, gas or coal). The South will become almost unlivable as the air conditioners are turned off one by one. Most airlines will go the way of the dodo, and take Boeing and McDonald Douglas with them. This is not good, as Boeing is the largest exporter of American manufactured goods in the country.

Psychologically, almost everyone will suffer severe depression caused by job anxiety and constant worry brought on by the loss of cultural stability (Source). The mainstream media will be full of happy news that no one will believe. Well, the remaining sane people, anyway. As a happy side note, the Great Depression led directly to the explosion of the movie-making industry, as millions flocked to cheap movie houses ("Air Conditioned Inside!") as people sought escape from the reality-hell they were living in with the fantasy world of big screen Fred Astaire/Ginger Rogers fantasy land. In the new depression, Hollywood will continued to provide fantasy escape entertainment, but "reality TV" will be a non-starter.

There will be inner-city riots that will not and cannot be put down, with acres and acres of burned business districts. The six o'clock news will cover these extensively, but in no particular depth, per usual. (History as such does not exist to the people who bring you the "news").

Local banks failed at a rate of about 600 per year during the Depression; expect the same this time, so, local bankers will be chased down and subjected to kangaroo trials by angry citizens, then hung or exiled. Large roving gangs of unemployed youth (black, white, brown and yellow) will cause untold mayhem. There will be curfews everywhere.

During the Great Depression the Constitution was still in effect and presidential and congressional elections were still held as scheduled. However, Bush will still be in office when the Crash hits, and since the Constitution has been nullified in its entirety under his regime, there is the strong possibility that he will declare war on Iran, suspend the November elections, declare martial law, and resume the draft. In that case - and barring a military coup - expect riots everywhere (Source).

Short of that, there will be actual martial law in selected places, although functioning military authority will be limited to large population centers - the rural countryside will be mainly pest-free - as our military is mostly overseas and will take ages to bring back en mass. Don't expect to see many tanks in the street in any case: they're all in Germany or Kuwait (Source).

On the personal level, if you're Joe Sixpack, you have zero savings (in fact, the average American savings rate is zero), so to pay your rent you will attempt to sell your plasma TV, your DVD players, your PlayStation, and your gun collection piecemeal (but keep the shot gun and the .45) and try to trade the XLT monster truck for a Jap import, and good luck on that. The waiting lines for bankruptcy court will be around the block, and you will probably have to pimp your daughters to pay the lawyer's fees anyway.

Hospitals will close, but individual doctors may treat your cancer in exchange for freshly-killed poultry. Expect an uptick in sales of The Idiot's Guide to Self-Dentistry.

The majority of the unemployed will spend their days in line at the state welfare office. Unemployment insurance is a state function, and, as most states are near broke right now, they will run out of money very fast. The more enterprising among us will then go out and stand on the sidewalk and sell pencils, if they can afford to buy any. Technically, a city or state cannot go "bankrupt" under present US law, but they can and do run out of cash. Then they "reorganize" (Source: ncwb.uscourts.gov). Still, when you're broke, you're broke. Then it's boiled shoe leather time, although I know personally and for a fact that there are people right now eating road kill.

Optimistic estimates are that this period of "economic instability" will be short-lived, but that's probably the result of the same wildly optimistic dreamland pseudo-thinking that got us into this mess in the first place. Realistically, I would guess that you can expect the same ten to eleven years of chaos and social disruption as the first Great Depression, which we really only got out of when we entered World War II. Think about that one, real hard.

The good news is that all the conditions are in place for a socialist revolution. You can expect heavily-armed resistance all over the place.

Life will not be easy after the crash, and you probably won't drop dead as a direct result of it, but you will definitely be living a vastly reduced lifestyle in economic, cultural and political terms. And if you think I'm kidding, you're an idiot and deserve everything you get. I sure as hell didn't make you hock your house or max out your credit line to buy a fucking $3,000 plasma digital High Definition TV set to watch "American Idol." You did.

Good night and good luck.

Related: Operation Garden Plot - The U.S. Military and Civil Disturbance Planning | Life During the Great Depression | Rex84

current-events

Will the government go bankrupt?

Does the black cloud of a depression hang over the nation?

Recession blues got you down? Well, there is some good news; the United States government can't (and won't) go bankrupt. It says so right here:

The NYT has a good discussion of how the United States government has been out front in criticizing other governments for not allowing financial institutions to go bankrupt, but is now rushing to rescue Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac from failure.

One item the piece gets wrong is its discussion of the risk of bankruptcy by the U.S. government itself. This is essentially zero, since the U.S. debt is denominated in dollars. If the United States ever had difficulty paying off bonds held by foreign central banks, it could print as many dollars as necessary to make the payments.

The mass printing of dollars would of course be inflationary and would mean that foreign central banks would get paid off in dollars that are worth much less than the ones that they lent, but they have already been happy to take large losses on the money lent to the United States. For example, the dollar has fallen by almost 50 percent against the euro since 2002, yet foreign central banks are still willing to lend money to the U.S. government at interest rates that are well below the inflation rate in the United States.

The foreign central banks presumably are willing to absorb such large losses because they want to prop up the value of the dollar in order to maintain an export market for their goods. As long as foreign countries cannot figure out how to create domestic demand for their output (it actually is not very hard for those who have read Keynes), they may find it worthwhile to lose large amounts of money on their loans to the United States in order to maintain their export markets in the United States.
- Dean Baker at American Prospect

Of course, this doesn't mean that you won't go bankrupt.

current-events

White House: Mum's the word on the US dollar

Believe it or not, Dana Perino, the bubble-headed bleach blonde who masquerades as the White House Press Secretary, let it be known that she is not allowed to talk about the shrinking dollar, under penalty of getting shitcanned.

Maybe if we don't talk about it, the problem will go away.

current-events

A financial crisis unmatched ...

The market is slipping at the rate of 1,500 points per month.

For those of my Gentle Readers who are not aware of my reading habits, it should be known that I subscribe to a number of financial newsletters, such as MarketWatch, The Financial Times, The Economist, RGE Monitor, etc. Lately, as I peruse the contents of my inbox, I feel like I'm standing on the Lip of the Abyss, and I'm getting vertigo.

Here's one of the more benign MS's I've received recently, this one from the Top Story page of the UK Guardian.

A financial crisis unmatched since the Great Depression, say analysts

* Larry Elliott, economics editor
* The Guardian,
* Tuesday March 18 2008

This article appeared in the Guardian on Tuesday March 18 2008. It was last updated at 00:09 on March 18 2008.

A century after John Pierpont Morgan rescued the New York stockmarket from a 50% sell off in share prices, his blue-blooded Wall Street bank was yesterday once again at the heart of attempts to contain the deepening global financial crisis.

In an echo of the "bankers' panic" of 1907, JP Morgan responded to what is being billed as a meltdown of historic proportions by agreeing to buy its stricken rival, Bear Stearns.

The length and severity of the crisis that broke over global markets last summer has had analysts delving into their history books. George Soros, who was largely responsible for Black Wednesday, the last bout of serious financial turmoil to afflict the UK, believes there has been nothing to match the events of the past nine months since the Great Depression.

Alan Greenspan, the former chairman of the Fed and the man blamed by many for setting off the boom-bust in the US housing market, agrees with the man who broke the Bank of England. Writing in the Financial Times yesterday, Greenspan said: "The current financial crisis in the US is likely to be judged as the most wrenching since the end of the second world war." [More...]

Greenspan, as you may recall, is the guy who helped engineer this pile of monkey dung in the first place, so I wouldn't put too much credence in his optimism.

St Valentine's Day is past, but we have another holiday coming up. Future historians might call this particular piece of work the Easter Egg Hunt That Went South.



current-events

Feds decide to hide economic data

Another ominous sign in a season full of ominous signs: the US Department of Commerce will shut down their website, www.economicindicators.gov, effective March 01, 2008.

This is the central clearing house that economists and commodities futures traders rely on for various crucial reports, such as Advance Monthly Sales for Retail and Food Services, Gross Domestic Product, New Residential Construction; stuff like that.

Apparently, the coming depression is going to be so massive, nobody will give a crap about any of this stuff anyway.

In related news, Mike Whitney has this report on Fed Chair Bernake's recent sitdown with Congress, engagingly titled, Bernanke's State of the Economy Speech: "You are all Dead Ducks."

It doesn't look good, Gentle Readers.

Critical Update: U.S. Credit Markets Collapsing!

current-events